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tABSTRACT
Conduct of agents in the Northern Malawi tobacco m arket channel
This study is based on the Industrial Organisation (10) theory to analyse the behaviour of farmers and 
firms and the economic performance and how it changes over time. This model posits that there are 
basic conditions that determine the market structure, which in turn determines the conduct of farmers 
and organisations involved in the tobacco industry.
There are over 10 000 growers and 200 intermediate tobacco buyers, who are structurally organised so 
as to not compete against each other. Both the growers and the intermediate buyers must eventually 
sell all their tobacco at the Mzuzu auction floor to four tobacco dealers who collude in price 
determination. These tobacco dealers in turn supply processed tobacco to four cigarette manufacturers, 
who appear to have significant power in influencing prices at the auction floors at prices dictated by 
the manufacturers. This behaviour of the tobacco dealers confirms the existence o f an oligopsonistic 
market at the dealer stage of the channel.
The existence of an auction floor does not necessarily imply free competition between dealers. 
Evidence suggests the conduct of the dealers is one o f a leader/follower model on the auction floors. 
The largest dealer is able to dictate optimum prices offered and volumes to be purchased on any one 
day of sale that will maximize profits for all the dealers. Furthermore the tobacco organisations have 
strong enough lobbying powers to reduce competition at the intermediate buyer level and to protect 
their members to a certain degree.
On the basis of the research findings the study recommends policies that will empower the growers 
and promote competition between the intermediate buyers. Policies that reduce collusion and 
encourage competition between dealers on the auction floor are recommended to break up the 
oligopsonistic market structure. A follow-up study is needed to determine how efficient the auction 
floor system is elsewhere and how collusion is regulated and competition promoted.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Agricultural Development and Marketing Co-operation (ADMARC) introduced burley tobacco in 
the Northern Region of Malawi, in 1971, as a potential cash crop in the smallholder farming sector. 
Burley plantings expanded considerably from 170 hectares to 9509 hectares from 1991 to 1998, while 
yields increased from 1200 to 1306 kilograms per hectare over the same period. Burley production 
increased dramatically from 204 tons to 12 417 tons over the same period (Msiska, 1998). This rapid 
growth in area planted, yield and output resulted from government guaranteed prices, input subsidies 
and easy access to markets.
In 1994 the Malawi government liberalised the tobacco market and removed the tobacco buying 
monopoly held by ADMARC and the tobacco supply monopoly held by estates in the growing of 
tobacco. This resulted in the entry of new buyers and smallholder growers into the market. Despite this 
increase in the number of buyers which in theory, can be expected to increase competition and improve 
prices received by fanners, tobacco growers have complained that they are receiving "unfair" prices 
from the buyers. This is because farmers have a lack o f bargaining power when negotiating prices for 
their produce. For example from 1997 to 1998, the Malawi Kwacha devalued from MK 15.29 to 
MK25.04 to one American dollar (TEAM, 1998), but the farm gate price of tobacco has only improved 
from MK 10.07 (TAMA, 1997) to MK 11.50 (TAMA, 1998) per kilogram o f first grade tobacco.
These poor prices would encourage many farmers to grow traditional crops such as maize, rather than 
tobacco. However, growing maize will not create sufficient cash income to ensure that there is 
adequate access to food for the family throughout the year. Ng'ong'ola (1995), realised that the low 
tobacco prices would promote maize production and effectively reduce maize prices as supply 
exceeded demand. His main concern was that no policies were being passed that would provide the 
necessary auction floor training for growers and that would improve competition on the auction floor. 
The abscence o f such policies has created an oligopsonistic tobacco market in Malawi, where a few 
dealers at the floors and certain tobacco related organizations are able to determine prices (Sant'ana, 
1999).
This paper is based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance analysis carried out in Northern Malawi by 
Sant’ana (1999). It will only focus on the behaviour o f participants in the Malawi tobacco channel. The 
aim o f this paper is that o f  contributing to literature aimed at illustrating important areas to be 
considered by policy researchers and policy makers. This is especially important, given that Malawi 
has implemented a policy for the complete liberalization o f the tobacco industry. By exposing 
oligopsonistic competition, decision makers will be able to reason and understand the prevailing needs 
in the tobacco trade.
2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The overall objective of the research is to investigate the conduct of the various agents in the tobacco 
market and to identify institutional and organisational innovations with the potential to empower 
intermediate buyers and farmers involved in the tobacco industry in Northern Malawi. The specific 
objectives are:
1. To identify how prices are determined on the auction floors,
2. To determine the behaviour of the dealers on the auction floor,
3. To determine farm-gate price and buyer behaviour,
4. To determine the behaviour of tobacco growers, and
5. To determine how the behaviour of tobacco related organizations affects the participants in 
the tobacco industry.
3. LITERATURE REVIEW
Sant'ana (1999) identified three main types of growers in Malawi: estates; smallholders; and tenants. 
The estates are large holdings, operate with credit and services facilities, and employ a large labour 
force. Smallholders produce a small amount o f tobacco as a second crop, use family labour, and have 
access to small land holdings and limited input and transport facilities. Tenants work for the estate 
owners who provide all the inputs and purchase the final crop from them.
All three growers are serviced with inputs purchased from retailers in all the district centres, 
throughout the country. Smallholder have access to input loans, organized by the National Smallholder 
Farmers Association o f Malawi (NASFAM). The estates buy inputs directly from retailers. In addition, 
estates obtain input loans from the Tobacco Association o f Malawi (TAMA). Tenants, on the other 
hand, obtain inputs on credit from their estate owners. This means access to inputs is not limiting 
throughout most o f Malawi.
All farmers utilise the same processing functions o f harvesting leaves when they turn pale green, 
drying them in bams to a preferred colour, storing, grading and baling tobacco for sale. Thus growers 
compete freely at the production stage.
There are three auction floors in Malawi: Mzuzu, Lilongwe and Limbe. Lilongwe is the largest selling 
over 50% o f the countries tobacco (Sant'ana, 1999). The main tobacco dealers have their factories in 
Lilongwe and Limbe. As such all tobacco bought in Mzuzu must go to the nearest factories in 
Lilongwe for processing and export to the cigarette manufacturers.
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In the Northern Region, tobacco is a relatively new crop. Survey data using the Chi-squared test at a 
5% significance revealed that 52% of the estates in Bolhero have been functioning for six to ten years, 
while 69.2% the small-holders for less than five years (Sant'ana, 1999). Smallholders are new and 
inexperienced tobacco growers. However their average yield is at 1108.28 kilogram per hectare, 
compared to the 1071.72 kilogram per hectare produced by the estates (Sant'ana, 1999). Analysis of 
the data indicated that 68% of the smallholders grow between 1.1 ha and 3.0 hectare of tobacco, while 
70% of estates grow three to twelve hectares of tobacco (Sant'ana, 1999).
Until 1996-1997, all tobacco had to be sold directly to Auction Holdings Limited (AHL) or to the 
Agricultural Development and Marketing Co-operation (ADMARC). ADMARC's role was that of an 
intermediate buyer for those farmers who did not have the means by which to sell directly to AHL. 
Tobacco was bought at the Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA) proposed prices and then sold on 
the auction floor by ADMARC (Sant'ana, 1999). The absence of a competitive market and pricing 
system at this level prompted the introduction of Intermediate Buyers Licence. The licence holder was 
granted permission to purchase tobacco from farmers and later sell it on the floors, thus creating 
competition for ADMARC and forcing prices to raise, so benefiting the fanners. However in the 
Northern Region the buyers are buying at the TAMA prices, due to the abscence o f competition in this 
sector.
Survey datum collected by Sant'ana,( 1999) show that tobacco channels are appropriate to the farmer 
type to a significance of 5%, using a Chi-squared test. Although 87% of the estates only use the floors, 
there are those which need to sell tobacco quickly to purchase food for tenants or inputs (8.7%). This is 
done through sales directly to intermediate buyers. Thirty-four percent of the smallholders are utilising 
the intermediate buyer for acquisition of cash early in to the season (Sant'ana, 1999). All growers tend 
to sell their low grade tobacco to the intermediate buyers, reserving the better leaves for the auction 
floors.
The intermediate buyer will purchase by grade and kilogram, while at the floors sales are by grades in 
stipulated weights. Once floors open, all buyers tend to sell directly to the floors. Tenants are meant to 
sell only to the estate owners. However Sant’ana, (1999) found that 25% o f the tenant farmers sell to 
the intermediate buyers in order to acquire cash for the purchase o f food and basic necessities for their 
families.
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Until 1998, the buyers were charged MK0.25 per kilogram of tobacco purchased (Sant1 ana, 1999). This 
inevitably led to a large number of participants' (843). The impact was found to be negative for estate 
growers, since most tenants were now selling estate tobacco illegally to buyers. As a result the 
Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA) lobbied for a law that would limit the number of buyers. In 
the 1999 season the charges were increased to MK.2.00 per kilogram purchased. This resulted in the 
number of buyers dropping to 202 and the expected buyer quota falling drastically from five million in 
1998 to one hundred thousand in 1999 (Sant'ana, 1999). Furthermore the Tobacco Control 
Commission (TCC) began to allocate tobacco buying areas to the intermediate buyers. Thus confining 
buyers to specified locations. As a result TAMA had successfully protected estate owners by limiting 
the intermediate buyer development, through a reduction o f competition between buyers.
The opening of the Mzuzu floors in 1996, was a great welcome for growers, as previously they had to 
send their tobacco to Lilongwe for sale (Sant'ana, 1999). Unfortunately with the new floor, there are 
still delays and prices are lower than they are at the Lilongwe floors. The Mzuzu auction floor is only 
utilized by four dealers: Limbe leaf, Stancom, Daimon and African leaf. A tobacco dealer company is 
contracted by a cigarette manufacturer to procure, process and transport green tobacco from the source 
to the factory. Once purchased, the bales are transported to their processing factories, where the 
tobacco is prepared according to manufacturer specifications.
The same four dealers in Mzuzu also buy on the other floors in Malawi. In the recent past the floors 
throughout Malawi serviced over 10 buyers. However: i) the international move against smoking, ii) 
the high tax charges on Malawi tobacco exports, iii) the high international taxes in tobacco sales, iv) 
the high capitol investments needed, and v) the competitive nature o f the tobacco business has 
encouraged merging o f all those dealers previously operating. As a result there are now only four 
buyers in Mzuzu and Lilongwe (Sant’ana, 1999). Limbe leaf has always been known as the largest 
buyer in Malawi purchasing 50% to 60% of the entire tobacco crop in Malawi followed by Stancom 
and Daimon with 21% and 20% respectfully. African Leaf being the smallest has 6% o f the market.
Sant'ana (1999), calculated the concentration ratio and Herfindahl index to determine if an 
oligopsonistic competition exists at the tobacco auction floors. He found the concentration ratio to be 
approaching 0, and the Herfindahl index increasing towards 1. These values indicates that the market 
favours Limbe leaf and that an oligopsonistic market exists.
Sant’ana (1999), identified numerous organizations that existed in Malawi to facilitate tobacco
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marketing for the numerous market participants. The Tobacco Association of Malawi (TAMA) was v 
founded in 1929. Its membership includes all estate growers, producer clubs, companies, syndicates 
and buyers who are registered with TCC. TAMA objective is to develop the Tobacco industry in 
Malawi and to advance and protect the interests of all growers through 
co-operation with government and other associations having similar interests.
The Smallholder Agribusiness Development Program (SADP) was formed in pilot areas, with the sole 
purpose of empowering smallholders through club and associations. The idea was to access inputs, 
loans, extension and marketing of tobacco growers. Through the SADP project, various small farmers 
organisations went on to form the National Smallholder Farmer Association o f Malawi (NASFAM) in 
1997. The association is open, free and diverse, with 100% ownership and control in the hands of the 
member organisations that actively participate in the affairs and operations o f the NASFAM. The 
major objective is to improve the economic and social conditions o f the smallholder by providing 
linkages with beneficial public and private sector service providers and by improving business, 
financial and marketing management capabilities o f smallholder member organisations.
The Malawi Tobacco Exporters Association (TEAM) was formally established in 1930. TEAM 
represents all buyers o f tobacco on the auction floors and is the body responsible for the discussion 
with representatives o f TAMA should problems of concern arise between the two parties. Originally 
membership was restricted to tobacco buyers and exporters but as the industry developed, processing 
organisations and manufacturers subsequently became eligible for membership. TEAM has an elected 
representative on each o f the following bodies: TCC, AHL sales committee, ARET and the Malawi 
Export Promotion Council. It therefore plays a significant role in the tobacco market.
The Tobacco Control Commission (TCC) is a statutory body established in 1938, under the control of 
the Tobacco Auction Floors Act o f Parliament (TCC, 1993). TCC is a controlling body for tobacco 
production and marketing. It advises government on the sale and export of tobacco, promotes and 
expands the sale of tobacco and controls the production and sale o f tobacco on the Auction Floors in 
Malawi. TCC issues the grower registration certificates and intermediate buyer permits that allow the 
above groups to sell directly at the auction floors.
Olney (1998), presented a follow up survey for the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) on the liberalisation o f the burley market and the impact it has on the 
smallholder farmer. He found that direct sales to the auction floors meant that fanners received the *■
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s maximum prices in Malawi. However there was a high risk of slow cash flow. For those farmers who 
sold to ADMARC or to intermediate buyers, the advantage is that weak clubs and individual farmers 
had a safety net and quick access to cash when needed. Unfortunately the price paid is low and quiet 
often below expences incurred.
4. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This study uses the Industrial Organisation (IO) theory to determine the behaviour of farmers and 
firms. Such a methodology is the standard tool for the analysis o f markets in the United States and the 
United Kingdom (Kohls and Uhl, 1990).The study will focus on the participant conduct only. Market 
conduct refers to the pattern of behaviour that firms follow in adapting or adjusting to the markets, in 
which they buy and sell (Pomeroy and Trinidade, 1998). It will include the methods employed by 
firms in determining prices and output, market channels activities, tobacco organisation behaviour and 
dealer conglomerate behaviour.
Participant conduct will be determined by the analysis of auction and farm-gate prices to identify price 
determination method. By observing the tobacco industry as a whole one can obtain a clear picture of 
participant behaviour.
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Objective 1. Auction floor price determination
Sales at a tobacco auction floor is considered the most efficient and competitive by the Tobacco 
Association o f Malawi (TAMA), the Tobacco Exporters Association o f Malawi (TEAM) and the 
Tobacco Control Commission (TCC). However if this were the case one would expect the prices 
offered on the auction floor to fully reflect prevailing world tobacco prices. Tobacco dealers such as 
Limbe Leaf, Daimon, Stancom and African Leaf are the largest tobacco dealers in Malawi and are also 
active players in most o f the tobacco markets world-wide. Production o f burley tobacco is concentrated 
in the USA (35%) and Southern Africa, with Malawi accounting for almost 16% and Zimbabwe for 
1% of the burley traded on the world market (Universal Leaf Tobacco, 1999). If the same buyers are 
operating in both Zimbabwe and Malawi, then both floors should be integrated because dealers have a 
prior knowledge o f what each floor can supply in relation to their needs. One would therefore expect 
the same price trends in both Malawi and Zimbabwe.
If the prices paid for burley tobacco at the Malawi auction floors are a true reflection o f regional prices, 
then one would expect a highly significant correlation between Malawi prices and the prices in the
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nearest competitor, which in this case is Zimbabwe. The central question for empirical analysis of v 
conduct is to test if  the two prices are indeed correlated.
P Kfal [Pzim]
(1)
Where: PMal = Tobacco price in Malawi
?Ztm = Tobacco price in Zimbabwe
Table 5.1 Correlation and regression test results for model Number one.
VAR Coefficient Constant F T Correlation
f*Zim 0.557 72.58 17.4* 4.17* 0.828*
Data source: TAMA (1998b) and TIMB (1998) 
NB: * = significant result
The correlation is significant at a 1% level, while the F-test and T-test at a 0.3% level. The high 
correlation between prices signifies that markets are integrated. This would support the presence of 
oligopsonistic competition within the market structure. If only the prevailing prices influence burley 
prices in Malawi, then surely prices should be exactly the same in both Zimbabwe and Malawi? 
However, Malawi prices differ slightly from Zimbabwean prices. Could there be other internal 
variables influencing prices in Malawi? A second question for empirical analysis is to test if indeed 
there are other local variables correlated with tobacco prices in Malawi?
* • ■
PtM  = [ S n C n P 0 - O ^ r P l z i J  (2)
Where: PtMll = Burley price in Malawi at time t
s, = Burley sold at time t
c, = Cost o f producing 1 kilogram burley at time t
P i "  1 M i l = Burley price in Malawi at time t-f
P t z i m = Burley price in Zimbabwe at time t
From this model o f price determination in Malawi, one would expect a priori: i) a positive relationship 
with volume o f sales, ii) a positive relationship with the Zimbabwean price, iii) a negative relationship
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A regression test of model two has been proven that both regional prices and local market conditions in 
Malawi influence prices at the auction floors in Malawi. All variables and the F-test were significant at 
a 5% level.
,  with production costs and iv) a negative relationship with hurley prices in the previous season.
Table 5.2. Regression test results for model two
Variables Co-efficient T-test
s. 8.06 x 10'° 5.887*
c, -0.359 -3.400’
Pf"  1 Mai - 0.486 -3.765*
f ^ Z i m 0.415 3.934'
F - Test = 18.15*
Data Source: TAMA (1997a, 1998a, 1998b) and T1MB (1998) 
NB: * = Significant result at a 5% level.
The positive relationship with Zimbabwean prices was explained in the previous model. The 
explanation for positive relationship with the volume sales is that cigarette manufacturers perceive 
Malawi burley to be the best cigarettes filler crop in the world, and given the low nicotine levels it can 
be blended into any cigarette, without influencing flavour to a large extent. As such there is a high 
demand for Malawi burley.
A high price in the previous season is the result o f tobacco shortages or exceptionally high-grade 
tobacco in that season. Prices will often drop in the following season because growers tend to increase 
production at the expense o f quality, in a bid to capture the previous price. Consequently, this larger, 
poor quality crop will earn a lower price. The negative relationship between price and production costs 
is explained by the tobacco quality. By improving production efficiency, one will inevitably lower 
production costs and enhance burley tobacco quality. The better quality crop fetches a higher price on 
the auction floor. The above test illustrates variables influencing prices at the auction floors. Quality is 
known to dictate prices offered by the dealers on the floor. If the growers had any significant market 
power, then surely the prices would rise as production cost do? This not being the case signifies that
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growers have little influence on pricing. The supply variable further indicates the power of the dealer 
in being able to dictate prices for any burley grade sold. Bearing in mind the variables found to 
influence burley prices in Malawi, one must question why the prices at the Mzuzu Auction floor are 
not the same as those offered at Lilongwe and Limbe floors? Could the absence o f a processing plant 
in Mzuzu and the necessity to transport all purchased tobacco to the nearest processing and packaging 
plant in Lilongwe influence pricing? Furthermore, would prices differ, given that the Mzuzu floors 
tend to open after and close before the Lilongwe and Limbe floors do? If operating times influence 
prices at Mzuzu floors, then one would expect a highly significant correlation, between floor prices, 
which changes with time. Lilongwe floor prices should effectively influence Mzuzu floor prices to a 
greater extent than Limbe, given that 50% o f all tobacco is sold in Lilongwe. Four different correlation 
tests must be carried out in a bid to identify which floor has a greater influence on the Mzuzu prices:
MZPr = [LLP97] (3)
Where: MZP^ = Mzuzu burley price in 1997
LLP97 = Lilongwe burley price in 1997
7 MZPvn= [LLP9«] (4)
Where: MZP9g = Mzuzu burley prices in 1998
LLP9g = Lilongwe burley prices in 1998
MZP9- = [LIP97] (5)
Where: MZP^ = Mzuzu burley prices in 1997
LIPjt = Limbe burley prices in 1997
MZP>h = [LI P«] (6)
Where: MZPm = Mzuzu burley prices in 1998
LIP,, = Limbe burley prices in 1998
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Table 5.3. Correlation and regression test results for models three to six.
TEST Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Correlation 0.792' 0.509* 0.7442’ 0.6845’
F-test 33.82’ 6.64* 24.8’ 16.75*
T-test 5.816’ 2.577’ 4.98* 4.093’
Coefficient 0.78 0.74 0.79 0.996
Constant 22.63 37.52 26.42 9.65
Data source: TAMA, (1997b 1998c)
NB: * = Significant result at a 0.001 level.
The above results would support the theory that the prices at the Lilongwe floor have a greater 
influence on the Mzuzu floors, than the Limbe floors. Furthermore the tests prove true market 
integration exists between the floors. This is a common feature when the same buyers are operating on 
both floors. The reduction in the correlation values from 1997 to 1998 for Mzuzu and Lilongwe would 
indicate that the Lilongwe influence is declining with time. This decline is partly explained by the fact 
that opening and closing dates of the two floors is now differentiated to reflect differences in the 
growing season.
Given that tobacco purchased in Mzuzu is transported to Lilongwe for processing, one must question if 
indeed the transport cost is a factor in determining Mzuzu prices? This being the case, then the 
difference between Lilongwe and Mzuzu prices should be equal to the transportation cost? For both
1997 and 1998 season the Mzuzu prices were lower than those offered in Lilongwe. This difference 
ranges between 4 USCents per kilogram and 12 USCents per kilogram, with a mean o f 10 USCent in
1998 and between 4 USCents per kilogram and 40 USCents per kilogram, with a mean of 15 USCent 
in 1997. These differences are similar to the cost o f transporting tobacco from Mzuzu to the factories 
in Lilongwe. O f further significance is the additional 2 USCents per kilogram not accounted for each 
year. The consistency maybe related to dealers having to construct storage deports in Mzuzu and pay 
annual premiums.
A
One can conclude that the prices at the Mzuzu floors are lower than those in Lilongwe to an amount 
equivalent with the cost o f transportation to Lilongwe, storage and other premiums. If one considers
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that costs incurred by dealers have a greater effect on price then production costs; it becomes obvious 
that dealers have a greater market power than the growers. For power to exist, the dealers would have 
to collude in determining these expenses before purchasing bales. There is no actual proof, but the 
evidence may posit that a "gentleman’s agreement" exists between buyers, regarding prices in Mzuzu.
Table 5.4 Transportation costs for one kilogram of tobacco from Mzuzu to Lilongwe.
DESCRIPTION 1998 1997
Transport cost per bale/km in Malawi Kwacha 0.60 0.60
Distance traveled 350.00 350.00
Transport cost per bale to Lilongwe (MK) 210.00 210.00
Cost per kilogram 
@ lOOkg/bale (MK)
2.10 2.10
Exchange rate to US$ 1 25.04 15.29
Transportation cost /kg in US$ 0.08 0.13
Mean difference between Mzuzu and Lilongwe prices 0.10 0.15
Storage and other premium expenses 0.02 0.02
Data source: Survey results
Objective 2: Tobacco dealer and auction floor behaviour
The previous section demonstrated that prices offered on the auction floor in Mzuzu are related to the 
prevailing regional prices, tobacco quality and to the costs incurred by dealers. If dealers are able to 
influence prices on the floors, then one must question the motivation behind those prices offered by the 
dealers.
The dealers interviewed claim that their customers (cigarette manufacturers) influence the prices prior 
to the marketing season. The manufacturers will approach all dealers individually, with tobacco supply 
contracts, in which, they specify the volumes required, the exact tobacco grades demanded and a fixed 
price they will pay per kilogram delivered to them. The dealers are than responsible for the purchase, 
processing, packaging and transporting o f the target weight to the final destination. Larger 
manufacturers such as Phillip Morrision will spread out their order amongst all the dealers. This makes
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good business sense, because relying on one dealer will put the manufacturer in a vulnerable position. 
Under this system dealers will not be in a position to demand higher prices from manufacturers. The 
limited number of manufacturers means that dealers are very competitive amongst themselves in 
securing contracts. The dealers go to great extremes to satisfy the manufacturers demands. A failure to 
meet contract specifications will result in the loss of contracts to other dealers. A good example is 
African Leafs’ market share, which rose from 5% to 6% in 1997 and 1998 respectively at the expense 
of another dealer. The reason being, the latter had difficulty meeting with its target weight for a 
specific customer in 1998 (Personal communication at the auction floors).
The dependency on larger manufacturers for business viability is primarily because contracts from the 
smaller regional cigarette manufacturers cannot support the dealer production expenses. The huge 
overheads and large infrastructure investments observed in this industry can act as a barrier to entry for 
other smaller, less established dealers. Economies o f scale will therefore play a major role in the dealer 
existence, which without the large contracts from these manufacturers faces a very real danger o f 
closure.
If indeed the manufacturers are able to dictate prices to all the dealers then surely these dealers are able 
to manipulate sales on the floors to be sure that all demands are met for a particular manufacturer. The 
dealers will inevitably rush to complete their targets as soon as possible. In doing so dealers must bear 
in mind the capacity o f their processing factory and their logistical ability to store and transport the 
tobacco. Most factories operate for only five months of the year, in which 10 000 kilograms per hour 
are processed for 24 hours a day. A dealer with this processing capacity cannot supply more than 43.2 
million kilograms in any one season. As such the daily quota o f tobacco purchased must fit the dealer’s 
capacity, while meeting with contract specifications. Therefore within the first 4 to 8 weeks of tobacco 
sales prices tend to be on the increase until all dealers are satisfied that they can meet the required 
monthly quota for the remainder o f the season (Sant’ana, 1999). At this time o f the buying season 
oligopsonistic competition is at it's height on the floors.
If an oligopsony does exist, then the observed conduct of the dealers would depend on decision made 
by the dealer with the largest market share. Sant’ana (1999), found that i) Limbe leaf has a 53% market 
share, ii) Stancom has a 21% market share, iii) Daimon has a 20% market share and, iv) Africa Leaf 
with 6% market share. Limbe leaf is expected to make the choice on a bale before the others do, which 
will maximise their own profits, while considering there followers profit-maximisation problem. 
Likewise should Limbe leaf loose interest in a bale, then Stancom would take over the role of leader
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and should Stancom stand down, then Daimon automatically takes up the role. For this behaviour to 
prevail, dealers must have prior knowledge o f the volumes and prices that each dealer can reach. 
Limbe leaf should also be able to punish any dealer who raises prices to a level that would not 
maximise profits for Limbe leaf. The presence o f these conditions would support the belief that a 
Stackleberg model exists with dealers.
It was previously shown that the manufacturers dictate prices and tend to spread out their orders to all 
dealers. This being the case, than it would be easy for Limbe leaf, and indeed any dealers to have prior 
knowledge of the estimated crop, processing capacities, the volumes to be purchased and the price 
which should be offered on the floors to ensure that all dealers can maximise profits, meet contracts 
and remain viable.
Behaviour on the auction floors depicts a Stackleberg model, where a large buyer is able to dictate 
prices at the level which is optimal to all other dealers. The auction floor sales team consisting o f a 
leading price starter, followed by an auctioneer and a ticketter stand on the right of the bale in question. 
Facing the team are the buyers. The smallest buyer occupying the weakest position on the floor, in 
terms o f the bidding process, faces the price starter. Following him is the largest buyers, who stand 
directly opposite the auctioneer and bringing up the rear are the remaining buyers in order o f market 
share. By standing directly in front of the auctioneer the largest buyer occupies the strongest position 
and tends to make first bid on the desired bale of tobacco.
The smaller dealers rarely compete with Limbe leaf for a bale. Instead you find that every so often 
Limbe leaf would stand down and Stancom dominates bidding for that bale. The same facility was 
made for Daimon and Africa Leaf respectively. If one o f the smaller dealer "stepped out of line", by 
pushing the price too high, the larger dealer would inevitably contact the manufacturers to complain, 
that prices were above acceptable levels. The manufacturer is in a position to threaten the culprit with 
the removal o f their contract if prices are pulled to high. Prices can therefore be maintained at the 
favoured level.
The observations made at the auction floors indicate that the manufacturers can control all activities 
carried out by the dealers. Therefore in order to remain viable dealers must take each other into 
consideration. Quite often the largest dealer has the upper hand over the rest o f the dealers. This 
conduct is related to the market structure, describing a Stackleberg model. Intrestingly enough, the 
same buyer position method is used on the Zimbabwean auction floors. However in this case there are
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ten to fourtheen dealers, so that the leader/follower model does not apply (Tobacco Sales Floor- 
Personal communication).
Objective 3: Farm gate pricing behaviour of intermediate buyers and estate owners
Farm level pricing for tenants is determined by TAMA. According to the representatives interviewed, 
the tenant prices are determined through annual farm budgets prepared at TAMA. These budgets take 
into account the tenant production costs, to come up with fair price that enables tenants to pay back the 
loans, while earning a sustainable income. If TAMA based prices only on the production costs and not 
the prevailing market price, then the tenant and estate markets are not integrated.
TP, = [TCt] (7)
Where: TP, = Tenant prices at time t
TC, = Tenant cost of production as identified by TAMA
Model 7 has shown that tenant prices are closely related to the cost estimated by TAMA. Now, if 
tenant prices are related to the floor prices then one can conclude that the tenant and tobacco markets 
are integrated and TAMA pricing is competitive.
Table 5.5 Regression and correlation results for model seven
Variable | Coefficient F-test T-test
| C, | 2.4 x lO 3 13.02* 3.602*
Data source: TAMA, (1998a)
NB: * = Significant result at 0.0226 level
TP, = [P ,]
Where: TP, = Tenant prices at time t
P, = Burley prices at auction floors at time t
(8)
»
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Table 5.6 Regression results for model eight
Variable Coefficient F-test T-test
P, 0.252 1.59 1.262
Data source: TAMA, (1998a and 1998b) 
NB: * = significant result
The results in model eight illustrate that the tenant price is in no way related to the auction floor prices. 
This tells us that the markets are not integrated and pricing is controlled by TAMA for the estates to 
benefit at the expense o f the tenants.
Several problems have been identified in the method being utilised to estimate these prices. The first 
being an under estimate for tenant production costs. The second common error is that o f using a yield 
estimate of 1500 kilogram per hectare of tobacco. This value is unrealistic with the prevailing rise in 
the input costs and the ever-increasing problem of tobacco land degradation. A third error is a failure to 
appreciate that prices vary throughout Malawi. Table 5.3.3 compares the production cost estimates by 
TAMA and the survey for the 1999 season. Observations show the vast differences in projected costs.
If after paying back their loan, the tenant run at a loss, then surely their conduct would be to terminate 
tobacco production. Given that they do persist, then there must be other benefits, which keeps them 
motivated? The estate owner is responsible for supplying all the tenants’ dietary and health 
requirements, so that tenant families are sure to be fed for 9 months o f the year. Secondly, tenants 
illegally sell part o f the tools, fertiliser and plastic sheeting provided by the estate owner to 
neighbouring farmers, whenever money is needed. Thirdly, by using family labour on his plot, the 
tenant is able to do casual work on other farms. Finally tenants sell the illegally tobacco they have 
produced to intermediate buyers, rather than to the estate owner. By doing so they can forgo their loan 
repayments to the estate owners.
If the tenant prices dictated by TAMA were fair, then tenants behaviour would be to focus all energy 
on producing the best possible crop, knowing that the final benefit is a fair reflection o f their effort. 
Therefore the TAMA price regulations are promoting a tenant behaviour, which has a negative effect 
on the viability of tobacco estates.
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Table 5.7 Cost estimates for 0.5ha of tobacco for the 1999 season according to TAMA and survey 
findings.
Description Survey Est. (Mk) Tama Est. (Mk)
Chemical Input 3175.86 3060.00
Tools 329.94 387.00
Labour 112.95 -
Maize 5599.79 3400.00
Bam Maintenance 973.22 320.00
Miscellaneous - 1580.00
Total Cost 10191.76 8747.00
Est. Yield Kg/0.5ha 440.00 750.00
Gross Income 6587.33 10986.15
Profit -3604.43 2239.15
Source: TAMA (1997b) and Survey results
The introduction o f intermediate buyers into the tobacco market is meant to provide smallholders with 
an alternate channel through which to sell their tobacco. If smallholder tobacco growers sell on the 
auction floor than they can expect payment only in the month of May. The reasons are that the Mzuzu 
floor opens 2 to 4 weeks after the Lilongwe floor does and that once tobacco is sold, payment takes a 
further 2 weeks. The delay in the opening of the Mzuzu floors and in payments creates serious cash 
flow problems in the early post-harvesting period, compelling farmers to sell part o f their crop to 
sustain themselves until the floors open and payment is followed through.
In the Northern Region there are fewer intermediate buyers, compared to the rest o f Malawi. This is 
primarily a result of: i) there being few individuals who can afford the increased registration costs, ii) 
the remoteness o f the tobacco areas, and iii) the controlled allocation o f buying areas.
Rumphi district has two large firms buying tobacco within the same area. Both these firms have the 
capital to employ many buyers and to purchase large quantities o f tobacco. The production shortfall in 
the 1999 seasons would surely, prompt these firms to compete against each other? Therefore if the 
intermediate buyer operates in a perfectly competitive market, then farm gate prices will change with
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respect to the tobacco demands in the market. Observations carried out, found that prices fluctuated 
between MK20.70 and MK30.00 per kilogram of first grade tobacco. This meant that buyers were 
trying to out-bid each other, by offering higher prices. So does perfect competition exist?
The structure created by the Tobacco Control Commission means that only a few buyers operate 
within an area, at any one time. If this structure promoted competition between intermediate buyers, 
then prices throughout northern Malawi would reflect market demands for tobacco. However the 
observed price offered by most the intermediate buyers is exactly the same as the tenant price proposed 
by TAMA. Tenants are prepared to sell at this price because none of the money will be used to repay 
loans to estate owners, while smallholders are cash strung and have no other options. The expensive 
registration fees and the controlled buying areas imposed by TCC have effectively reduced the number 
of buyers, so killing competition at this level o f the market.
Objective 4: Behaviour of tobacco growers
The market structure o f tobacco has encouraged farmers to participate in the production and marketing 
of tobacco. This is evident for the rapid increase in growers over the past five years (Msiska, 1998). 
What are the factors affecting this change in the number o f growers? Could the tobacco/maize price 
ratio, the previous season cost o f production and the number o f growers already operating induce a 
change?
[  GNrGN,.)] = [P(t/m)„C,.i ,GN,.i] (9)
Where: GN,= Grower number at tim et 
GN,., = Grower number at time t-1
Pt/m, = Price ration o f tobacco and maize 
C,., = Production cost at time t
GN,., = Grower number at time t-1
The change in the number o f growers has i) a positive relationship to price ratio, ii) a positive 
relationship to production costs in the previous season, and iii) a negative relationship to the number of 
growers in the previous season. Testing o f this model proved otherwise as none of these variables had 
a significant relationship with the changes in grower numbers. The insignificance o f previous grower 
numbers maybe attributed a data collection error on the part of the Tobacco Control Commission 
(TCC), who maybe registering the number o f clubs and estates growing tobacco, rather than the actual 
number o f  growers involved.
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%Table 5.8 Results for the regression test on model nine
1 Variables Coefficient T-test
g n ,. -0.30 -1.36
C '-‘
3.26 2.599
[ Pt/m, 855.80 0.286
1 F-test = 2.3
Data source: TAMA, (1998a, 1998b) 
NB: * = significant result
The failure o f model eight means that one must reconsider the factors influencing grower numbers. If 
the tobacco prices offered on the auction floors are favourable, then more growers will produce 
tobacco in the hope o f capitalising from these prices.
[GN.-GN,.,] = [?<} (10)
Where: GN, = Grower number at time t
GNt.| = Grower number at time t
P, = Burley price at the auction floor
Model ten failed the regression test, with a T-test value o f 0.266. Therefore the prevailing floor price 
has no significance on the change in grower numbers.
The failures o f the above tests prove that there are other factors that must be influencing farmers to 
grow tobacco. In recent years the state and developing organisations have been promoting tobacco 
production at the smallholder level. Liberalisation o f tobacco production saw extensive development 
work being carried out to provide services such as input loans, transportation, auction floor access and 
extension training to potential smallholder tobacco growers. Could the previous legislation and 
absence o f these services have limited growers? If legislation and access to the above services limited 
tobacco production, then liberalisation and the provision o f these services would surely encourage 
farmers to grow tobacco. Statistics compiled by Msiska (1998), found that the number o f growers 
increased substantially after liberalisation of tobacco production. Furthermore the survey revealed that 
all smallholders rely on the provision o f production and marketing services by the state and by
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organisations such as AHL, NASFAM, ARET and TAMA. Smallholder indicated that in the absence 
of these organisations, they would not be able to grow tobacco profitably. Unfortunately there is 
insufficient data available to test the extent to which these incentives are encouraging more farmers to 
grow tobacco.
Objective 5: Effects of institutional activity on the conduct of growers and buyers.
Through-out this entire chapter it has been shown that the conduct o f all the players in the tobacco 
chain is closely related to the conduct o f the various organisations or lobby groups set up to protect the 
interest of various parties. These organizations include TAMA, NASFAM, TCC, TEAM and MRFC.
5.1. Impact of TAMA on growers and buyers
TAMA is the largest growers association, consisting mainly o f influential estate owners. Is TAMA 
influential enough to change national policies? If TAMA is a strong lobbying power, then it's conduct 
should promote policies that favour estate growers.
The first major impact by TAMA is in depressing the formation o f a tenant association. By so doing, 
TAMA ensures that tenants remain powerless against exploitations by the estate owners. Secondly 
TAMA has prompted the TCC to introduce laws that will limit the number o f  intermediate buyers. The 
increased cost o f registration and the allocation of buying areas have significantly reduced the number 
o f buyers. As a result tenants have no choice but to sell to estate owners. Finally TAMA is still able to 
dictate tenant prices in a liberalised tobacco market. This contradiction o f the national tobacco policy 
leaves tenants at a disadvantage, prompting the behaviour described earlier.
One can therefore consider TAMADs conduct to be one that favours members Furthermore it is able to 
influence the behaviour o f  tenants and intermediate buyers.
5.2. Impact o f NASFAM on the conduct of smallholders
NASFAM is another grower association, which provides loan, input, transport and extension services 
for smallholder tobacco producers. Would these smallholders exist in the absence o f NASFAM? 
NASFAM is empowering the smallholder by focusing on their production and marketing needs. 
Results from the survey show that higher tobacco yields o f 1108 kilogram per hectare are obtained by 
smallholders compared to the 1071 kilogram per hectare realised by estates. Furthermore the high 
grade smallholder tobacco fetches a better price on the auction floor than that of estates.
«
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The facilities created through NASFAM have contributed significantly to the conduct o f smallholders. 
Where as in the past these farmers earned minimal incomes from maize, they can now earn 
substantially higher incomes from tobacco production and sales. The more successful NASFAM 
becomes, the greater the number o f smallholders who will turn to tobacco as a cash crop. The activities 
carried out by NASFAM have had a positive effect on the income levels of many farmers and on the 
weight of burley tobacco realised in Malawi.
5.3. Impact of TEAM on the conduct of dealers.
The Tobacco Exporters Association of Malawi (TEAM) is the major marketing body, representing the 
dealers, processors and exporters. There is no direct indication that TEAM has any direct influence on 
tobacco prices and volumes in Malawi. Still, if  the tobacco dealers practise a Stackleberg model, then 
they must be in a position to maintain a market structure that will support this model.
Could TEAM be the tool they use? Data collected by TEAM will indicate projected export earnings 
and volumes, dealer capacities and potential export markets. This data give dealers the necessary 
information about each others projected market share enabling them to organise their daily buying 
quotas on the floors. With this data each dealer can accommodate the others needs. In so doing, a 
Stackleberg model can be supported.
One can therefore say that TEAM is the instrument used by dealers to obtain data on the Malawi 
burley tobacco market. Usingthis data enables them to ensure manufacturer demands can be met by all 
dealers.
5.4. Impact of lending institutions on the conduct of growers and intermediate buyers.
The principle lending institutions in Malawi are the National Bank, Commercial Bank of Malawi, 
MRFC and ADMARC. The two banks finance estates and intermediate buyers, ADMARC and MRFC 
provide input loans to all growers Interest charges range from 49% to 52%, depending on the clients 
collateral and reputation. All require that clients place a guarantee o f 15% to 40% o f the loan, in order 
to secure a loan.
The MRFC is one o f the largest loan institutions in the region and they service a largest proportion of 
tobacco growers. Both the small-holders and the estates. The 1996,1997 and 1998 seasons saw MRFC 
issuing total loans around the value o f MK40 million, while in the 1999 season the total exceeds 
MKI60 million. This could possibly be a result of the higher input costs experienced as a result o f the
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Malawi Kwachas' devaluation last year and the substantial increase in loan applicants in 1999. The 
number of tobacco clubs on loan seems to be increasing from 20% in 1995 to 55% in 1999.
Estates on the other hand have decreased by 35% in the last 5 years. This trend maybe as a result of the 
higher number o f overdue loans from the estate sector than the clubs. In fact the MRFC feels this 
group is a lower risk. This is because they offer social collateral, that is if one member does not pay, 
then the whole group is affected. As such the other members should put pressure on the offender to pay 
on time. This appears to be working for MRFC and the clubs.
The number of clubs have increased substancially as a result o f the MRFC offering club loans. This 
has contributed significantly to the increase in growers and prompted smallholder to only sell to 
intermediate buyers for consumption purposes. The estates have developed a bad reputation with 
lending institutions, who now screen them carefully. The limited credit has prompted estate owners to 
reduce production and take up intemediate buying. The abscence o f a loan facility for intermediate 
buyers, means that they are unable to offer higher prices and ensure that their tobacco is properly 
cured, graded and baled.
5.5. Im pact of TCC on growers and intermediate buyers.
The TCC was initially set up as a controlling body, for tobacco production and marketing. It is 
responsible for the issuing of grower registration certificates and intermediate buyer permits. These 
allow the above groups to sell directly at the auction floors. They issue out quotas' for both the growers 
and the intermediary buyers. Producers pay US$10.00 for their registration, while intermediate buyers 
pay MK2.00 per kilogram for a minimum of 1.5TONS of tobacco. Buyers can purchase as large a 
quota that they can afford, yet are limited to only one licence.
The high cost for intermediate buyer licences and the zoning of buying areas have subsequently 
reduced the number o f buyers. As such the market is not competitive and farmgate prices remain low. 
Thus growers must rely on a few buyers to sell their tobacco, thus facing the chance o f exploitation by 
these buyers.
The failure by TCC to recognise tenants as growers has effectively placed them at the mercy of the 
estate owner. No tenant organization exists to "keep check" o f their needs and problems. As such TCC 
accepts the TAMA tenant prices without questioning the effects they on growers and tobacco 
production.
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Regarding sales the law states that all Malawian tobacco must be sold on the auction floors in the form 
of tobacco bales o f  60 kilogram to 100 kilogram in weight. No farmer or intermediate buyer may sell 
directly to the large tobacco dealers. This creates a barrier in that farmers can only sell bales to floors 
and if they wish to sell a small quantity it must be to the intermediate buyer. Dealers however are 
allowed to purchase foreign tobacco, and bring it into Malawi for processing in the local factories. As 
such many intermediate buyers, smuggle tobacco into Tanzania and Zambia, where they sell to the 
dealer representatives there, rather than on the floors.
6. CONCLUSION, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY 
This study demonstrated the behaviour o f the tobacco market participants, concentrating on the factors 
determining prices, the factors encouraging tobacco growers and the conduct of institutions that have 
formed over time to facilitate the production and marketing o f tobacco.
6.1 Auction floor price determination
The correlation between prices in Malawi and in Zimbabwe indicates market integration, probably as a 
result of the same dealers operating on both floors. Differences between their respective prices are 
attributed to internal variables, these being sales volumes, cost o f production, and prices in the 
previous season. All the variables identified can be associated to tobacco quality. Therefore quality 
could dictate prices offered by the dealers on the floor. If the growers had any significant market 
power, then surely the prices would rise as production cost do? This not being the case signifies that 
growers have little influence on pricing. The supply variable further indicates the power of the dealer 
in being able to dictate prices for any burley grade sold.
Tests carried out found that prices at the Lilongwe and Mzuzu floors are closely correlated. This 
market integration is expected as the same buyers are operating on both floors. The reduction in the 
correlation from 1997 to 1998 for Mzuzu and Lilongwe is partly explained by the fact that opening and 
closing dates o f  the two floors is now differentiated to reflect differences in the growing season. 
Differences between the floor prices are equivalent to the cost o f  transporting tobacco to the processing 
floors in Lilongwe, plus storage and premium expenses incurred in Mzuzu by the dealers. Given that 
costs incurred by dealers have a greater effect on price than production costs, it becomes obvious that 
dealers have a greater market power than the growers. For such power to exist, the dealers would have 
to collude in determining these expenses before purchasing bales.
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6.2 Dealer and auction floor behaviour
The dealers claim that their customers (cigarette manufacturers) influence the prices prior to the 
marketing season. This is evident by the fact that manufacturers dictate a final price to be paid. 
Tobacco orders are spread out amongst all dealers, to ensure that the manufacturer can keep prices at a 
level that maximises profits for themselves. If indeed the manufacturers are able to dictate prices to all 
the dealers then the dealers have to manipulate sales on the floors to be sure that all demands are met 
for a particular manufacturer. Using TEAM data on projected export earnings and volumes, dealer 
capacities and potential export markets, the dealers have information about each others projected 
market share, thus enabling them to organise their daily buying quotas on the floors.
The fundamental questions for Malawi are whether AHL is a free competitive sales market and does 
the conduct o f the dealers depend on decision made by the dealer with the largest market share. Limbe 
leaf in this case does make the choice on a bale before the others do, thus maximizing its own profits, 
while considering followers' profit-maximisation problem. By using the manufacturer, Limbe leaf is 
further able to punish any dealer who raises prices to a level that would not maximise profits for Limbe 
leaf. The observations made at the auction floors indicate that the manufacturers can control all 
activities carried out by the dealers. Therefore in order to remain viable dealers must take each other 
into consideration. Quite often the largest dealer has the upper hand over the rest o f the dealers. This 
conduct is related to the market structure, describing a Stackleberg model.
6 3  Farm-gate pricing and buyer behaviour
The farm level pricing for tenants determined by TAMA is based on the tenant production costs, and 
has no relation the prevailing market price. The tenant and estate markets are therefore not integrated.
Cost estimates are too low and the expected yields far exceed the real tenant output. The TAMA prices 
do not reflect market conditions, favouring estate owners. Since the tenant prices are low, tenants tend 
to focus all their energy on other activities rather than on production. As such quality is poor. The end 
result is lower prices for the estates themselves.
6.4 Grower Behaviour
No conclusive evidence was identified to be the major factor influencing the behaviour o f tobacco 
growers. The existance o f tobacco promotional organizations may play a significant role.
M
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* 6.5 Tobacco institutions behaviour
The influence of TAMA on the buyer regulations and prices has prevented free competition to persist 
amongst the tenants and the intermediate buyers, thereby affecting their behaviour. Similarly 
NASFAM has been found to influence the behaviour of many farmers. Their services have encouraged 
many a maize grower to turn towards tobacco as a cash crop. The success of their conduct can be 
measured by the fact that smallholder tobacco yields are greater and their quality is superior to that of 
estates. MRFC has facilitated the growth and participation of small-holders through the provision of 
loans for tobacco production.
TEAM has provided a means by which dealers can gain knowledge of each others needs and price 
limitations. TCC has implemented regulations that reduce competition on the auction floor and at the 
farm-gate level. The tobacco quota system limits the amount of tobacco one can buy or sell, thus 
preventing a free competition at all levels of the market.
6.6 Policy recommendations
If the oligopsonistic competition at the dealer and manufacturer stage is to be eliminated, then policies 
the promote competition must be considered, some suggestions include: i) income tax exemptions for 
the first five years o f production, ii) export tax exemption for the first five years o f production, iii) 
reduced import duties for factory machinery purchased in the first year, and iv) relax laws limiting the 
amount o f cash a foreign firm can return to their place o f origin.
The present quota system and high licence costs act as barriers to entry at the buyer and dealer stages. 
Such barriers should be revised to promote investment into these sectors, rather than limiting 
participation. This is most significant at the intermediate buyer level, where the new licence cost and 
the buying zone limitations have effectively reduced the number of buyers and consequently reduced 
competition. This in turn promotes low farm-gate prices and unrealistic returns to intermediate buyers.
TCC needs to review the tenant pricing system. The current method used to determine the tenant prices 
is biased towards the estates. TAMAs failure to consider the inflation rates, the transportation 
limitations and the overall management requirements for estates and tenants has resulted in unrealistic 
prices for tenants. The negative incomes alter sales have resulted in the tenants illegally selling tobacco 
to intermediate buyers to escape repayment o f debt to estates. The price setting by TAMA does not 
conform to the theory o f tobacco market liberalization. Instead the role o f TAMA should be that of a 
facilitator, assisting estate owners and tenants in deciding on a farm-gate price that reflects market
t
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demands. If the estate offers a price above that of buyers, then tenants will be more enthusiastic to 
produce high quality tobacco.
6.7 Suggestions for fu rther research
A follow-up study should be carried out to determine the efficiency of the auction system in other 
countries. Furthermore it should assess the regulations used to promote competition and discourage 
collusion between dealers on the floors.
There is no evidence showing the factors that influence farmers to grow tobacco. It would be important 
to carry out a study to identify the factors influencing the number of tobacco growers and to what 
extent the current liberalisation o f tobacco has prompted tobacco production.
6.8 Conclusion
This study has demonstrated that the conduct of the participants in the Malawi tobacco industry chain 
is closely related to the existing oligopsonistic structure. The dealers tend to follow a leader/follower 
behaviour on the floors, the prices are determined by the dealers on the floors and by the estate owners 
and buyers at the farm-gate. Finally the tobacco institutions are geared towards promoting their 
member interests, to an extent where they can influence other participants actions.
The findings suggest promoting policies that will encourage competition at the dealer and 
manufacturer stages, while empowering the growers and intermediate buyers.
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